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I. 
Economic development planning is_ implementation. A Plan, 
in and of itself, has no more (and usually less) significance than 
a similar policy and possibility oriented research paper by an 
independent eocnomist. A Plan which includes neither projects and 
policies through which to operate nor a firm state commitment to its 
operation is more akin to the stock New Year's Day budget resolutions 
than to serious economic policy-making. 
The need to emphasize this platitude stems partly from 
observing that in fact politicians, civil servants and economic 
technocrats in Africa' and South Asia tend to look on plan formulation 
and implementation as disparate processes rather more often than as 
integral and integrally linked parts of the development planning 
process. Even more, however, the need arises because evert when such 
a unity is accepted its logic is not consistently applied either to 
plan formulation and revision or to implementation institutions and 
procedures.1 
A comprehensive plan represents a national resource allocation 
programme for a specified time period. A partial plan represents 
allocation of specified (presumably largely public sector and at the 
extreme public investment only) portions of national resources with 
1 These comments are based on observations in Burma,. Malaya, Singapore, 
Ceylon,. Thailand,. Ghana,- Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda* Tanzania, the Cameroon 
Republic, the. Sudan, and Ethiopia. A. more detailed analytical examination 
of specific features, of the Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania Plans 
appears in the Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, 1965, 
under the title: "Four African Development Plans". 
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with greater or less formulation of relationships with the 
mechanisms expected to allocate the balance of available real 
resources. 
To be operational any budget must provide a system of defineable 
and quantifiable categories, a set of criteria for decision making which 
can be applied to concrete cases, a structure of responsibility for 
taking decisions and for taking them according to the criteria and 
within the categories set out, and a systematic and speedy information 
chanelling set to allow central evaluation of the sum of individual 
decisions and decentralized receipt of adjustments to the category or 
decision criteria set. Only in such a framework can one meaningfully 
talk about-much less test for - feasibility and consistency whether 
prior to physical implementation or during the course of it. 
In terms of plan operationality these conditions take the. 
form of reasonably specific and costable project and project group 
proposals, linked with a set of reasonably specific policies, e.g. 
in taxation, recurrent expenditure, private investment, role of state 
enterprise, and formulated within a computed (projected) fram of the 
relevant levels of constraining scarce resources available. For opera-
tionality to be sustained a system of rapid reporting not only of results 
but of future period operating plans must be imposed on all state and 
all major private units with a'central statistical-analytical unit set up 
to make effective use of the data secured. Further, a set of principles 
for making additions to, subtractions from, and retiming within the 
project list is virtually essential if the exigencies of physical implications 
2This is a minimum condition. The more precise the project identifi-
cation and costing the smoother .their physical implementation but the 
longer the delay in arriving at the. pre-physical implementation stage 
represented by the Plan document. 
are to be contained within the- framework of progress toward central 
objectives. Unless such principles - based on interaction as well as 
direct cost/benefit effects - exist ad hoc decisions are virtually 
certain to lead to results bearing rather scanty relation to any 
coherently formulated set of objectives advanced either during the 
programme drafting or physical implementation phases.3 
The logic of implementation further requires priority attention 
to three constraint areas which virtually always prove to be binding: 
personnel, institutional structures, and time. These tend to be 
underemphasized in the programme preparation phase and visualized only 
in an ad hoc, fragmented manner during physical implmentation. Inadequate 
personnel, inappropriate or "inexperienced" institutions,4 and procedures 
which (however sophisticated the method or precise the results) are slow 
in yielding data and decisions can and do impede policy and project 
fulfillment at least as often and perhaps as much as the foreign exchange 
and investible surplus constraints. 
Operationality, however, is not a purely technical or insti-
tutional matter. It is equally a question of political will. Here again 
the separation of programme formulation from physical implementation has 
3Vide Ghana's 1959-1964- Plan (de facto abandoned in 1 9 6 l ) , the Cameroun 
•Republic 1961-1965 P l a n , the current Nigerian Plan (except for the Eastern 
. Regional Plan). 
4Colonial administrative - civil service structures were neither designed 
nor equipped to carry out a broad, direct state role in economic 
development. Indeed, both in the U.K. and in France their metropolitan 
parallels have undergone sharp modifications in response to recognition 
of their similar inadequacies in relation to the economic role of the 
modern state. 
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unsatisfactory results. Governments are not interested, in economic 
policy as an end. in itself but as a means to attaining socio-political ends. , Unless a national economic 
development plan proposal is seen by the state's leaders to be a 
quantitative statement of economic means to fulfill (partially) the 
national socio-political programme they genuinely seek5 it will not 
become operational. Verbal "acceptance" is not unlikely but there 
will be a political will to alter, not to implement. 
Emphasis on implementation - and therefore operationality.-
requires recognition of at least seven critical absences in African (or 
for that matter tiers monde in general).economies: 
1. of an effective market mehanism leading even approximately 
to desired resource and product flow, stock, or allocational 
results; 
2. of the institutional framework through which such a market 
mechanism could operate; 
3. of an adequate body of planning experience, structures, and 
personnel; 
4. of the institutional patterns through which planning decisions 
could become implementation actions; 
5. of adequate data from which to formulate projects, policies, • 
and coordinated plans (or for that matter market mechanism 
improving reforms); 
6. of any substantial body of economic analysis based on 
assumptions appropriate to the "general case" of non-
industrial, economically dependent, low income states6; 
5This statement is independent of the content of their programme. E.g. if 
the ruling elite's central aims are the creation of a"civil service bour-
gcliae1' within growing opportunities for personal enrichment no plan not 
furthering these objectives will be implemented. 
6AS opposed to the "special case" of industrial, largely autonomous, high 
income states, cf. Dudley Seers "Why Visiting Economists Pail" Journal of 
Political Economy, August 1962 and "The Limitations of the Special Case 
Bulletin Oxford Institute Econ. and Stat. May 1963 and the author's Stages 
In Economic Development: Changes In The Structures of Production, Demand 
and International Trade, Bank of the Sudan, Khartoum, 1965. 
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7. of government willingness (indeed often ability) to accept or implement 
economic policies unless these afford•tangible short run gains to 
critical interest groups (which may or may not include the general 
public) whether or not these are consistent with rapid economic 
development. 
Prom the implementation centred approach spring a series of arguments 
which can be grouped in four "cases": 
1. The case for a project based approach; 
2. The. case for a comprehensive macro-economic frame of 
reference; 
3. The case for plan centrality in formulating all policies involving 
resource allocation; 
4. The case for state institutional pattern based on plan implementation 
requirements. 
II. 
Individually sound projects implemented in the absence of a 
plan are likely to have substantial beneficial results, a plan which is 
not composed of a set of projects cannot become a reality7. Most 
comprehensive African Development Plans lack not only a complete set of 
costed projects but even an initial list of known feasible projects for 
initial action and a comprehensive working list of identified proposals 
to be converted into a final project set during physical implementation. 
70ne can, in fact, point to successful colonial "plans" in illustration 
of this point, cf. B. Niculescli Colonial Planning, Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1958. The inverse, of course, also holds - individually unsound 
projects, if implemented, can do substantial harm to an economy especially 
if the "opportunity cost" of the scarce resources used is counted. 
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Project preparation is an area•in which the inadequacy of sepa-
rating the programme preparation phase in time and function is particularly 
evident. Given the reality of a low initial stock of projects checked 
for technical feasibility and cost, the need is for a continuous flow 
of additions to this stock - at least initially at arate greater than 
that of physical implementation both to avoid bottlenecks (or resource 
mis-allocations) resulting from imperfect knowledge and to increase the 
data stock available in formula.ting decisions on future action. 
The present heavy dependence on "outside" project analysis . 
tied either to would be financers, investors, or suppliers is distinctly 
unsatisfactory. There is no reason to suppose this type of analysis will 
yield a comprehensive group of studies, emphasize those most critical in 
national terms, or give a uniformly dependable picture of probable costs 
and benefits8. Priority needs to be given to building up one (or several 
coordinated) project indentification and analysis staffs and to ensuring 
that their relative competence in agriculture, industry, physical infrastruc-
ture, and human infrastructure (education and training nutrition and preven-
tive medicine, community development and administration) is reasonably equal. 
The need for balance stems from the fact that widely unequal competence 
will lead to overemphasis on the type of projects most competently identified 
and costed and failure to realize that this emphasis does not necessarily 
reflect underlying economic cost/benefit ratios.9 
Material aid programme analysts tend to work on the implicit assumption that 
their rational economic history and system is at least.largely relevant and 
•appropriate. Investor analysts seek to emphasize the risks and thus the 
need for guarantees, safeguards, and high profits. S e l l e r analysts tend 
to be notoriously optimistic about the technical as well as economic viabi-
lity of projects using their investment goods. 
9In the short run the quality of the relevant project staff is_ a sound 
criterion for resource allocation, e.g. Kenya's 1964 Plan emphasis on agri-
culture flowed logically from greater ability to formulate action in that 
sector. However, an equal priority is to increase the competence of evalua-
tion in other areas or a permanent bias will result. 
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The limitations of' project analysis centered planning stem from 
the difficulty of handling interrelationships, of comparing alternative 
projects, and of evaluating the consistency and approximation' to optimality 
of a programme aggregated from individual projects. These limitations 
are often overstated and can, to some extent he relaxed but they are real. 
Direct cost/benefit ratio analysis of individual projects is usu-
ally reasonably straightforward.. However, it does not deal with indirect 
effects, nor with the possibly different cost/benefit ratios pertaining to 
inter-related project constellations. If it is assumed that the most 
important indirect effects are direct linkages then evaluation of project 
complexes e.g. livestock upgrading - tanning and packing - leather and 
carrying - required transport facilities as groups will approximate the over-
all economic impact of the projects. 
Certainly there is no a priori reason to assume that projects 
or project groups with high cost/benefit ratios have higher than average 
indirect effects or future potential. The case for proving such offsetting 
gains rests on their proponents. However, it is valid to base computations 
of cost/benefit ratios on total flows (discounted) over an appropriate time 
span not merely on the first few years of full operation. 
"Return linkage" effects actually create greater problems in 
project analysis that "outgoing"ones. The rate of growth of demand for an 
output cannot be calculated without reasonably definite data on the rate 
'•and distribution of growth in demand both nationally and internationally. 
This, in turn, depends both on all other projects and on exogenous (to the 
economy being planned) forces. 
In principle a complete set of evaluated projects (all probable 
marginal and intermarginal cases identified, if necessary grouped, and fully 
analyzed) could be subjected to linear programming resulting in an aggregated 
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macro-plan which would be feasible, consistent and a fairly close approxi-
mation of optimality0 However, this is not a live possibility when the 
identified project set is know to be incomplete and when final feasibility 
studies must be carried out during the implementation of the programme. 
Arguments for using "real cost" prices diverging from those 
prevailing in the market are not limited to project centered planning -
"shadow prices" if appropriate are at least as critical in a macro as amicro 
cohtext - but do create another limitation. Overall scarcities and surpluses 
of factors exist only in relation to total - not individual project -
demand. Therefore "shadow prices" must be calculated for the economy as 
a whole before application to individual projects.11 
III. 
The case for macro-planning is confused by the existence of 
numerous examples of pseudo or erroneous macro - plans. These fall 
into at least four types: 
1. The utterly unrealistic macro-plan put together in absence (or 
defiance) of data on the actual economic structure and potential of 
the state. The Cameroun Plan (1961 - 1965) exemplified this; 
1°It would not be fully optimal unless both optimum technical choices and, 
when appropriate, shadow prices had been used in the exercise. 
11 In proactice this may be a case for approximate calculation of foreign 
exchange, unskilled labour (including costs of relocation and services), 
and skilled manpower shadow prices not per se for a broad macro-approach. 
A tentative project set would allow such shadow prices to be determined 
and used as a basis for final project set amendment. 
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2. Macro-plans constructed on fairly plausible overall assumptions and tar-
gets but without any clear indication as to how these are to be imple-
mented physically (projects or policies) on the micro-level. The 
sections of almost all African plans dealing with the private sector 
suffer in greater or less degree from this deficiency; 
3. Macro-plans, not in themselves implausible, and conjoined with micro-
proposals but with no (or at least inadequate) integration of the macro-
projections and targets with the micro-means. Both the current Nigerian 
and the initial Kenyan Plans appear to suffer from such fragmentation; 
4. Macro-plans superficially integrally supported by policies 
and projects but which, on more detailed examination, reveal that the 
micro-components were deduced from the macro-level without serious 
attempts either at direct identification or of preliminary cost and 
feasibility evaluation. The current (1964-1970) Ghana Plan displays 
a number of cases of such "forced fitting." 
These "approaches" all violate the principle of programme formu-
lation integration with physical implementation. While an "aggregated" 
plan consisting of individual projects can be feasible and consistent even 
in the absence of a formal macro-framework12 an aggregate plan without 
a structure of projects is not operational and cannot be tested for consis-
tency or feasibility in any manner relevant to implementation. 
The case for aggregative plan lies in its use to create a frame-
work of broad quantitative goods, relationships, and constraints which both 
provide for an orderly approach to the micro-level and aid in the identifi-
12By definition however a consistent and feasible, set of projects does have 
an implicit macro form. The operational question is whether the cost/ 
benefit ratio of making that frame explicit and of formula ting,it ;first 
as a guide to project selection is such as to justify aggregative planning. 
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cation of likely project possibilities.13 
Determining the impact of economic growth and change on 
demand levels - and therefore the viability of specific projects -
can require either an initial aggregative estimate revised in terms of 
project possibilities or an aggregation of project proposals for checking 
and revision in light of their macro-implications. The aggregative 
initial step would appear to give a firmer analytical basis and to be 
likely to save time in selecting projects to evaluate in detail but the 
choice at this level could go in either direction. 
The same alternative approaches hold true for the computation 
of certain critical macro-magnitudes e.g. foreign exchange gap (or 
mirabile dictu its absence), skilled manpower "balance". The maximum 
financeable gap can be estimated first and used in the process of project 
selection _or the tentative project aggregation tested in terms of the 
feasibility of its import requirements (and savings) both capital and 
recurrent. 
The clear gains resulting from a process of programme 
formulation by "approximation" beginning with a macro-projection "model" 
appear amenable to grouping in categories: 
1. greater ability to ensure that the plan's overall results 
do relate to government socio-political goals and (therefore) 
of obtaining effective political backing; 
2. a clearer picture of•the broad structural1 4 relationships 
13These factors may be of only seconday concern when primarily export 
industries, import substitution based on present market sizes ahd/or 
increasing gross national product through re-distribution of the owner-
ship of present productive sectors form the bulk of the overall economic 
agenda. Even then a frame for project comparison can be of practical value. 
i4Structure is here used to mean the patterns of relationships between 
resources and their uses on the one hand and demand (national and global) 
on the other plus the institutional frame in which they operate. 
-11-
within the economy and of their modification over the plan 
period. Such a picture would appear to be essential to any eco-
nomic strategy based on bringing about basic changes in the stru-
cture of production, demand, or of factor income recipients. 
3. a better organized' procedure for estimating the total feasible 
programme and for weighing alterative projects against another; 
4. a moderately precise yardstick against which to measure both the 
progress of physical implementation and of "the implications of 
proposed changes at the individual project level. 
How detailed an aggregative analysis is attempted depends 
partly on the data available,15 partly on the competences of staff, and 
partly on the role the macro-plan is intended to play. .In fact macro-
data is intrinscially no harder to secure than micro and, indeed, collection 
and evaluation at the different levels of aggregation are usually comple-
mentary. Staff competence is often a more serious constraint - if almost 
all available expertise goes into macro-planning this ('macro"!) re source 
misallocation will lead to much larger resource mis or non-allocations 
during physical implementation. 
The question of uses is more complex. Clearly a macro-plan may 
be used as an initial suggestive guide and a subsequent rough check on an 
intrinsically aggregated micro-plan. In this case the macro-plan need not 
be in great detail - its use is to preclude major errors of allocation, 
to highlight cases in which indirect effects must be explicitly considered, 
and to define the operative resource constraints. Alternatively- as in 
the Tanzania Plan and the ECA - PAO Zambia Plan Proposals - the macro-
plan (first approximation) ma be used as the initial step in drawing 
15This is not a one way relationship. Data .supplies are highly dependent 
on demand. To postpone aggregative planning on the grounds of inadequate 
data and the collection of •such data as not essential to a micro-plan 
approach is circular. 
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up the micro-plan, The stages could run: 
1. Selection of target rate of growth and of 
distribution of purchasing power; 
. 2. Disaggregated pattern of demand growth; 
3. Selection.of viable projects from 2. checked against * 
technical and cost feasibility; 
4. Checking of projected production pattern for consistency; 
5. Computation (aggregated) of total resource requirements and 
checking against projection of availability; 
6. Successive'repitition of the process to arrive at a final 
plan approximating consistency, feasiblity, and optimality 
in terms of the original aims the plan is intended to 
further. -
In this case the macro-planning cannot be separated from the 
micro and must be on a higher level of detail and precision. On the 
other hand, this formulation suggests that the"project approach" when 
generalized to take account of project complexes, indirect impact and 
shadow prices and "successive approximation" macro-approach tend to 
converge. 
Two special problems arise in regard to techniques in aggregative 
plan formulation: sectoral breakdowns and capital/output ratios. On the 
first the relevant comment appears to be that sub-aggregates should be 
categorized in whatever method is most useful for the purpose in hand. 
The standard input-output table rarely meets this test, the "project comp-
lex" often does. Capital output ratios on a sectoral or global - as 
opposed to a project - level tend to be more dangerous than useful. 
Attempts to secure direct sectoral incremental ratios tend to lead to 
unrealistically low estimates (2.1 in the case of one current plan with 
heavy industrial and infrastructure components). Aggregation from project 
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estimates (which can more easily be derived from comparable past instances) 
appears much sounder. However, these can usefully be aggregated by sector 
and for the economy as a whole to see whether the derived macro-ratios 
appear plausible.16 
I V . 
The case for plan centrality stems from the fact that a resource 
budget cannot be implemented unless it is followed. Prom this point of 
view'comprehensiveness is a virtue and the inclusion of public recurrent 
expenditure In the area-covered by the plan qua 'allocation system virtually 
essential. The rate of recurrent expenditure increases in most African 
states is inconsistent either implicitly with investment plans or explicitly 
with plans including recurrent expenditure target within national income 
projections.17 The need for plan centrality is identical whatever the 
approach to programme formulation used. 
The logic of plan centrality suggests that at least five "budgets" 
should be drawn up for the plan period during the programme formulation 
period and put in final annual form during the physical implementation 
stages: 
1. an investment budget (including the private sector in as 
accurate a way as poss ible); 
2. a recurrent public expenditure budget; 
3. a skilled manpower budget (with further education as one 
of the uses); 
16This process of testing derived aggregates against values observed under 
comparable conditions is probably fairly generally useful for high level 
manpower needs. Serious discrepancies on the low. side suggest omissions 
in the micro-calculations. 
17See bottom of page 14. 
-14-
4. a foreign exchange budget; 
5. a private consumption budget. 
The first four budgets are self-explanatory. The last is 
less precise but can be useful in evaluating the impact of income 
changes on real consumption levels by major income group. In general, 
African plans underestimate the built in increases in consumption 
resulting from incremental salary scales and shifting of occupational 
distribution toward the cash crop and wage sectors.18 
Precisely where responsibility for, enforcing and, when appropriate, 
modifying these budetsis to lie is a separate question. Plan centrality is 
consistent with Treasury decision making if-and only if - the Treasury feels 
committed to act within the context of the plan. Divided responsibility 
for the different budgets appears to be less likely to prove workable than 
united responsibility. At least in principle, the economic analytical staff 
associated with programme formulation and coordination - evaluation of physi-
cal implementation would appear the most appropriate group to draw up the 
annual budgets in each category, whatever their formal location in the govern-
ment machine. 
17The resource allocation feature is often complicated by imprecise allocation 
of output level increases by year. In some cases a constant growth rate 
during the plan period is assumed, a most unlikely result if the average 
rate is to be substantially above that of the past period. In virtually 
all plans there appears to be an inadequate allowance for the lag between 
project identification and full oroduction. The x^ esult is a consistent 
over-estimate of resources available especially during the initial years 
of the plan. 
18G-iven a population increase rate of 2%, a standard salary increment of 
5% a year and a salariat growing 'a year, and ah increase of the 
commercial forming - wage earning proportion of the labour force by. 1% 
a year (e.g* from 30 to 55% over five years) constant prices and no 
change wage or salary scale the annual rise in real consumption will 
tend to be 4-6%. 
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V. 
Acceptance of the importance of economic planning represents a 
substantial shift in the explicit and implicit objectives and role of the 
state. From this follows the case for evaluation and revision of 
governmental and prastatal institutional structures in terms of their 
effectiveness in programme formulation and physical implementation. 
One of the critical problems is.that of outlook. 
Traditional ministries have set views on their proper status, duties and 
internal autonomy which often conflict with coordinated planning. 
The civil service as a whole usually tends to regard economic policy as 
primarily a matter of expenditure approval, a view strengthened by the 
tendency to Treasury primacy. 
The debates on whether a separate Planning-Development ministry 
should be established or a Planning Directorate placed in the head of 
government's office often becloud the central objectives: 
1. acceptance of Plan centrality by key state officials, 
2. creation of understanding and support for planning by 
these officials not only verbally but in their own 
departmental operations, 
3. broadening of' the base of effective participation in 
planning (including programme formulation) while at the same 
time, strengthening the coordinating capacity of the central 
planning staff. 
The structure which does most to achieve these ends in any given situation 
is most appropriate. In practice,.a universal requirement is a competent, 
politically significant minister with the ear of the head of government. 
For example if a Plan oriented minister of this calibre is named to finance, 
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Treasury primacy can be placed behind the plan and the all too typical 
Planning-Finance battle avoided (or fought within the enlarged finance 
ministry at lower real costs in time and decision reversal terms). 
Plan centrality is often interpreted to mean centralization at 
least of programme formulation, coordination, and evaluation. So far as 
broad decisions are concerned this is valid but in practice the centrali-
zation tends to be much more inclusive and potentially self defeating. 
While the degree of decentralization optimal in any given case may vary, 
African plan formulation - coordination - evaluation mechanisms are almost 
all at the extreme centralization end of the spectrum. The practical 
reasons behind this stern from personnel shortages seen as requiring all 
significant decision taking to be put in the few professional hands 
available.19 
The disadvantages are threefold. To the extent that the bodies 
responsible for physical implmentation are not integrally involved in the 
process of programme formul- tion their understanding and support for the 
"accepted" programme will be limited. The continued physical implementation 
agency concern with the current Tanzania Plan despite an extended period 
of key vacancies in the ministry of Planning and Economic Development 
illustrates the positive obverse. To the extent that regional and local 
plan advisory - community implementation bodies are not created (and 
ideally staffed in a way leading to some technical competence) the-pla.n 
will be the weaker both in terms of inadequate attention to local 
possibilities and small scale projects and also of mobilizing public 
understanding and support behind planning. The Tanzania's Zonal plans with 
19At the extreme this attitude can result in the Planning Director 
formulating virtually the entire plan and the Director of Statistics 
virtually the entire annual economic survey. 
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their related regional and area development committees20 represent a 
step in the direction of overcoming these local-regional weaknesses but 
have been of limited effect because of local technical weakness and central 
difficulty in staff recruitment coupled with distrust of decentralization. 
Finally concentration of all significant decisions in programme formula-
tion - coordination - evaluation at the centre appears to violate the com-
parative advantage principle. Inexperienced local or regional decision 
makers may make slightly poorer average choices on secondary matters but 
they will gain experience and - more critical - the time of the limited. 
expert group at the centre can be concentrated on fewer, more critical 
issues. The same considerations hold a fortiori in physical implmentation 
agencies. 
On the other hand autonomy of state agencies and a fortiori of 
state and para-statal (including cooperative federation) bodies is some-
times carried to a point more consistent with anarchy than planning. The 
first - and often the single most important - step toward tightening coor-
dination in this direction lies in better information collection and better 
processing of the information once received. That a majority of even 
present African plans do not include annual evaluation analyses based on 
quantitative data is a telling illustration of this situation.21 
Information is usually received in inadequate or inappropriate 
detail and only _ex post (sometimes very considerably ex post in the case 
of autonomous units although the East African record is on the whole fairly 
20Kenya's regional plans - at least initially - sufferred from the economic 
illogic of several of the regions albeit some appeared to show substantial 
data collection and evaluation as well as useful project identifications. 
2Exceptions include Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, the UAR, and Kenya (counting 
the Plan revision as a de facto evaluation study).• 
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good in this regard). The budgetary process gives adequate projection data 
on government agencies but the same cannot usually be said of autonomous 
corporations and other public sector bodies. The concept of submitting 
annual proposals (perspectives) for output in physical and revenue terms, 
costs broken down by major category, use of scarce resources (especially 
skilled manpower and foreign exchange), investable surplus (including 
depreciation), investment targets and financing intentions for coordination 
into an annual resource budgeting procedure is not so much rejected as 
simply not envisaged.22 Effective coordination and evaluation requires 
better, faster, and different data submission, ^nly then can processes -
which are critical to maintaining both pace and direction in plan 
implementation be carried out comprehensively and rapidly enough to have 
a real impact on error correction and opportunity capitalization. 
R.H.G. 
Dar-es-Salaam 
November, 1965. 
22In some cases such annual perspectives do not appear to exist even within 
the autonomous units, a failing with every serious implications. In such 
cases their required submission would have substantial micro-efficiency 
increasing potential.-
